Do conglomerate firms have the ability to allocate resources efficiently across business segments? We address this question by comparing the performance of firms that follow passive benchmark strategies in their capital allocation process to those that actively deviate from those benchmarks. Using three measures of capital allocation style to capture various aspects of activeness, we show that active firms have a lower average industry-adjusted profitability than passive firms. This result is robust to controlling for potential endogeneity using matching analysis and regression analysis with firm fixed effects. Moreover, active firms obtain lower valuation and lower excess stock returns in subsequent periods. Our findings suggest that, on average, conglomerate firms that actively allocate resources across their business segments do not do so efficiently and that the stock market does not fully incorporate information revealed in the internal capital allocation process. * Guedj and Huang are from the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. Guedj: guedj@mail.utexas.edu and (512) 
Introduction
A fundamental question in finance is to what extent capital gets allocated to the right investment projects. In addition to picking projects within each business segment, conglomerate firms also have the task of making capital allocation decisions across different business segments and industries. This paper asks whether, on average, conglomerate firms that actively allocate resources across their business segments do so efficiently.
The literature highlights that the way in which a firm implements its internal capital allocation can have different potential implications for the firm. On the one hand, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that socialism or power struggle within a firm can induce the firm into inefficient allocation and be harmful in the capital allocation process. On the other hand, Williamson (1975) and Stein (1997) suggest that a well functioning internal capital market can create value by allocating capital to its best use. Marino and Matsusaka (2005) and Ozbas (2005) show that rigid capital budgets can be useful and even optimal when there is an internal capital competition in a conglomerate.
This literature motivates our empirical analysis. We introduce three measures of capital allocation style to capture the varying aspects of a firm's active capital allocation process. All three measures are defined as the change in fractional capital allocation across segments from a passive benchmark, and differ only in the benchmark from which the deviation is calculated.
The Deviation from Lagged Capital allocation (DLC) uses a firm's past capital allocation across segments as the benchmark and defines a firm as active if it changes its relative allocations from year to year.
1 The Deviation from Industry-adjusted Capital allocation (DIC) uses the capital allocation in corresponding single segment firms as the benchmark and defines a firm as active if it deviates from the industry average allocation. Lastly, the Deviation from Segment Free-cash-flow (DSF ) uses the free cash-flow generated by each segment as the benchmark and defines a firm as active if it transfers cash-flows across 1 For example, if a firm allocates (40%, 60%) of its total capital expenditure across its two segments in year t and changes its allocation to (25%, 75%) across the two segments in year t + 1, then the DLC measure is defined as 
segments.
We compare the performance of firms that follow passive benchmark strategies to those that actively deviate from those benchmarks. If active deviations improve allocational efficiency, then we expect active firms to perform better on average; on the other hand, if managers lack the ability to properly allocate capital or the lack of clear guideline in the capital allocation process intensifies internal power struggle and destroys value, then we expect active firms to perform worse.
Our main finding is that, irrespective of the measure of activeness, active firms have worse performance than passive firms, as measured by their lower industry-adjusted profitability.
Moreover, active firms have lower valuation levels, as measured by their industry-adjusted Q, and experience lower subsequent excess stock returns than passive firms.
We construct our measures of capital allocation style (DLC, DIC, and DSF ) using the segment-level accounting data reported in Compustat Segment and Industrial Annual files. We first sort firms into portfolios according to their capital allocation style, and then compare the average industry-adjusted profitability of these portfolios.
2 We find that the active firms have significantly lower industry-adjusted profitability than the passive firms.
To control for the possibility that firms with different internal capital allocation style are also different in other ways that could result in their performance difference, we use several additional analyses. First, we match active and passive firms by their past profitability and firm size. We find that, while passive firms maintain a similar industry-adjusted profitability prior to and following the portfolio formation period, the matched active firms experience a significant reduction in their average industry-adjusted profitability. Thus, our result is distinct from the possibility that firms with poor past performance are forced to make changes and that these firms continue to perform worse in the future. Second, to account for other firm characteristics that could drive both capital allocation style and performance, we conduct bivariate analysis by comparing performance of firms in portfolios sorted independently on our measures of capital allocation style and various firm characteristics such as size, number of segments, investment opportunity, growth, dispersion of investment opportunities among segments, leverage, and financial distress. The poor performance of active firms remains. Third, we control for these firm characteristics simultaneously in a regression analysis, with time and firm fixed-effects to capture potential year-and firm-invariant unobserved characteristics. Active firms still perform significantly worse than passive firms. Our findings suggest that firms that actively change their internal capital allocation subsequently experience lower operating performance.
Having established the poor operating efficiency of active firms, we then examine the valuation and stock performance of these firms. We find some evidence that these firms have lower valuation level on average and that their valuation level drops further following active changes in capital allocation, leading to lower future stock returns. In a fully efficient market, the stock price impounds all relevant information, including what is revealed through the internal capital allocation process. Thus, the lower valuation level and lower stock performance of active firms reflect a joint result of active conglomerate firms having worse performance and the market not fully recognizing it.
To rule out other alternative explanations for our results, we explore a wide range of robustness tests. We conduct matching and firm level regression analysis for the valuation result to control for firm characteristics that affect both capital allocation style and firm valuation, including lagged valuation level, capital expenditure growth, dispersion in investment opportunity across segments, level of financial constraints, leverage, and Ohlson's (1980) measure of the probability of financial bankruptcy (O-score). For the stock return results, we control for a variety of known factors that could affect stock returns in addition to firm level characteristics. Our results that active firms have lower valuation level and lower subsequent stock return remain unchanged.
This paper is closely related to the large empirical literature on the works of internal capital market. On the one hand, there is an inherent value to an efficient internal capital market (Stein (1997) , Khanna and Tice (2001) , Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) , Billett and Mauer (2003) , Guedj and Scharfstein (2007) , and Cremers, Huang, and Sautner (2008) ); on the other hand, internal capital allocation seems at times to destroy value (Lamont (1997) , Scharfstein (1998) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). Our paper contributes to the literature by categorizing the style of capital allocation and by
showing that, on average, the more active conglomerate firms are in their internal capital allocation, the worse they perform subsequently. Our results suggest that, although internal capital market can improve resource sharing across business segments, firms that actively shuffle resources around, on average, do so inefficiently.
Our finding that the stock market does not fully incorporating the capital allocation information is related to the market inefficiency literature. For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) find that the market does not fully incorporate information about the firm's R&D expenditure; Lamont and Polk (2001) find that the information conveyed in the conglomerate discount predict future stock returns; Daniel and Titman (2006) find that the market does not fully incorporate intangible information about the firm; and Hou and Robinson (2008) and Hoberg and Phillips (2008) find that information about product market competition is not fully incorporated into prices.
Although we interpret our finding of differential future stock returns as a result of the stock market inefficiency in incorporating capital allocation information into prices, our findings might also be consistent with risk-based explanations.
3 However, without a formal model, it is hard to explain our results based on risk, in particular, why firms with more active internal capital market have less exposure to systematic risk, and hence require lower expected returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our measures of capital allocation style. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 4 documents the low profitability of active firms. Section 5 summarizes the valuation and stock return analyses. We conclude in Section 6.
Measures of Capital Allocation Style
We categorize capital allocation decisions as active or passive depending on the deviation of firms' action from passive benchmark strategies. A benchmark strategy is a mechanical decision rule that a firm can implement. We introduce three benchmark strategies that capture different aspects of the internal capital allocation process. Our measures of capital allocation style are defined as the deviation from these benchmarks and capture the value creation or destruction by firms' active capital allocation decisions.
Deviation from Lagged Capital Allocation (DLC)
Our first benchmark is the firm's own capital allocation in the previous year. This benchmark describes a very rigid capital allocation rule that ignores changes in industry condition or operating efficiency of business segments over time. Harris and Raviv (1996) , Marino and Matsusaka (2005), and Ozbas (2005) suggest that rigid capital budgeting can be useful and even optimal when there is asymmetric information and agency problems between the headquarter and division managers. Our first measure, the Deviation from Lagged Capital allocation (DLC) is defined as the change in fractional capital allocation across business segments over time. In particular,
where CAP X i,t is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm f in year t, and the set F includes only segments that appear in both year t − 1 and t. 4 Since capital expenditure is always positive, the dlc measure is bounded between 0 and 1.
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To capture the average characteristic of a firm rather than one-time changes, we define DLC as the three-year average of dlc:
For conciseness, we report results only using the three-year average measures. 6 In unreported analyses, we repeat all tests using both the one-year and the five-year average measures and obtain similar results.
The DLC measure captures the rigidity in the capital allocation process: Firms that follow a rigid strategy of maintaining a stable capital allocation over time have a low DLC measure; and firms that actively change their relative capital allocation from the previous year have a high DLC measure. It is possible, however, that the rigid strategy calls for significant resource allocation between business segments, especially when the segments have different cash flow growth. The rigid benchmark is considered passive only in the sense that the capital allocation can be achieved by following a mechanical rule. No active decision is needed once a firm commits to the benchmark strategy.
Deviation from Industry Capital Allocation (DIC)
A conglomerate firm may change its capital allocation in response to changes in investment opportunities in one or more of the industries composing the firm. Our second measure, the 4 For example, a conglomerate firm has segments A, B, and C in year t − 1 and segments B, C and D in year t, then only segments B and C are included in set F for the definition of dlc f,t . If there is no common segments between years t − 1 and t, then dlc f,t is defined as missing.
6 To maximize the number of observations, for DLC f,t we only require that dlc f,t is not missing. If one (or both) of dlc f,t−1 and dlc f,t−2 is (are) missing, then we redefine DLC f,t as the average of the non-missing variables.
Deviation from Industry Capital allocation (DIC), uses the capital allocation in corresponding single segment firms as the benchmark and defines a firm as active if it deviates from the industry average allocation. For each conglomerate firm, we build a mimicking firm with identical capital allocation across segments in year t − 1. The mimicking firm grows each segment's capital expenditure at the same rate as the average single-segment firm in the same Fama-French-48 industry. The measure dic is defined as the difference in the fractional capital allocation between the conglomerate firm and the mimicking firm:
where CAP X i,t is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm f in year t, the set F includes only segments of firm f that appear in both year t − 1 and t, and g i,t = ( s∈I CAP X s,t )/ ( s∈I CAP X s,t−1 ) is the growth rate of the aggregate capital expenditure of single-segment firms in the same industry I as segment i. 7 In a similar fashion to DLC, we define DIC as the 3-year arithmetic mean of dic to capture longer-term trend in internal capital allocation.
The DIC measure captures the active deviation from the industry standard: Low DIC firms are passive "indexers" that allocate their capital following the industry-average capital allocation; and high DIC firms are actively deviating from the industry average.
Deviation from Segment Free-cash-flow (DSF )
One source of (in)efficiency of internal capital market is the reallocation of available cash flows across segments. We introduce a third measure that uses the free cash flow generated by each segment as the benchmark and define a firm as active if it transfers cash flows across segments. The Deviation from Segment Free-cash-flow (DSF ) is defined as the difference between the fractional allocation of CAP X across segments and the fractional composition of their free cash flows:
where CAP X i,t is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm f in year t, SF i,t−1 is segment i's free cash flow in year t − 1, defined as the sum of net income and depreciation, and the set F includes only segments of firm f that appear in both year t − 1 and t. We also define DSF as the 3-year arithmetic mean of dsf .
The DSF measure captures the active allocation of segments' free cash flows: Low DSF firms are passive and effectively treat each segment as a stand-alone firm by allowing each segment to invest its free cash flow from the previous year; and high DSF firms are actively transferring capital from one business segment to another.
The three measures of capital allocation style have one thing in common: They all capture the degree to which a firm actively deviates from a benchmark strategy. The term active may suggest that the deviation is a result of active choice by the management team. In practice, however, this deviation could also result from internal power struggle or corporate socialism, against the best intentions of the management team. It is hard to differentiate between these two possibilities, and we do not attempt to separate them. Thus, all our results should be interpreted as the combined effect of managerial judgment and their execution ability in handling internal politics.
We perform all of our analyses on all three measures. For simplicity, we refer to firms that actively deviate from benchmark strategies in the allocation process (those that have high DLC/DIC/DSF measures) as active firms and refer to firms that follow passive benchmark strategies (those that have low DLC/DIC/DSF measures) as passive firms.
8 8 This notion of activeness and passiveness is consistent with the categorization of mutual funds into actively managed and passive index funds. Similar to the fact that passive index funds (for example, value or growth index funds) can have significant turnover in response to changes in index composition, our passive firms may undergo significant capital allocation between business segments. They are passive only in the sense that their allocation rules are similar to the mechanical rules that we have identified.
Data and Summary Statistics
This section explains the data sources and describes the main characteristics of firms in our sample, as well as the characteristics of firms with different capital allocation styles.
Sample Selection
The main data source in our study is the Compustat Segment and Industrial Annual files.
Per Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 14 (SFAS 14), firms are required to report basic accounting data such as sales, assets, depreciation, capital spending and operating profits for every distinct business that constitutes more than 10 percent of total sales for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1977. Compustat segment files contain this segment-level accounting data. Since June 1997, revised disclosure requirements, SFAS 131, superseded SFAS 14. Under the new requirement firms do not have to report line of business data unless they are organized that way for performance evaluation (Berger and Hann (2003) ). Due to this change, there could be some differences in the data before and after 1997, which we control for by examining subsamples in the two data periods.
We drop segments with (i) name "other", (ii) primary SIC code equal to zero, (iii) SIC code greater than or equal to 6000 (which are mainly financial and services industries), (iv) incomplete accounting data (capital spending, sales, depreciation, operating profits), (v) anomalous accounting data (zero depreciation, capital spending greater than sales, capital spending less than zero), (vi) sales less than $20 million, and (vii) only one observation (which is insufficient to estimate a segment-level change in capital allocation). To be included in our sample, a firm needs to have at least two segments that satisfy the above requirements for at least two consecutive years. The resulting sample comprises 3,243 multi-segment firms during the period 1981-2006. On average we have 902 firms in each year of the sample ranging from 574 firms in 1998 to as many as 1,367 firms in 1980.
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary characteristics of our sample of conglomerate firms as well as three subperiods (1981-1988, 1989-1997, and 1998-2006) . We have a total 23,620 firm-year observations. There are slightly more firms in 1981-1988 than in later periods.
Conglomerate firms in our sample have on average about 3 segments and a book value of total asset of 3, 194 million dollars. The firm size increases significantly over time. The book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity to market capitalization, decreases from 0.92 to 0.42 over the three subsamples, with an average of 0.68. Firms' profitability measure, the ROA (defined as the income before extraordinary item divided by the average value of total asset at the beginning and at the end of the fiscal year), decreases from 0.04 to 0.02 over the three subsamples, with an average of 0.03. The average ratio of capital expenditure to total assets is 0.07 and the growth in capital expenditure is about 10%. The concentration of segments' capital expenditure is measured using a Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared capital expenditure share for each segment, and is about 0.6. All three measures of capital allocation style have a mean around 0.15 and are stable over the three subsamples. In all our analyses, we consider only the average measure over three years to capture stable firm characteristics rather than one-time changes in firms' capital allocation policies. In unreported analyses we check the persistence of the one-year measures (dlc, dic, and dsf ) by sorting firms into annual quintile portfolios and computing the subsequent measures for each portfolio. We find that all three measures are persistent for five years after the portfolio formation period. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus our analysis on three-year average measures.
Panel B reports the summary statistics of our capital allocation measures. While DLC and DIC have similar distributions with a standard deviation around 0.12, DSF has a much higher standard deviation of 0.7. This higher standard deviation is driven mostly by extreme observations (the 5% and 95% percentile observations are quite similar) and is due to the volatile nature of cash flows. In constructing the DSF measure, we exclude observations in which the firm level cash flow is negative.
Panel C reports the cross-correlations of our measures as well as their pairwise correlations with other firm characteristics. The correlation of DLC and DIC is significant at 0.85. If firms were to change their relative capital allocation across segments (measured by DLC) mainly as a response to changes in investment opportunities in corresponding industries, then high DLC firms should on average have low deviations from the industry benchmark, and the correlation between the DLC and DIC measure should be low. The high correlation between DLC and DIC, therefore, suggests that only a small fraction of the changes in internal capital allocation can be attributed to the changes in industry conditions. The low correlation between these two measures and DSF (at .09 and .07, respectively) suggests that these changes in capital allocation are not driven by free cash flow at the segment level either. The pairwise correlation between our measures and other firm characteristics are quite low: no pairwise correlation coefficient is higher than 0.25 and most of them are below 0.1. Therefore, the three measures capture aspects of the internal capital allocation process that are distinct from other firm characteristics.
Summary Statistics of Quintile Portfolios Sorted by Capital Allocation Measures
To examine the non-linear relation between our measures and other firm characteristics and to minimize the effect of extreme observations, we utilize portfolio approach for most of our analysis. We sort firms into annual quintile portfolios based on each measure of the capital allocation style. Firms in lower quintiles are passive and follow benchmark capital allocation strategies; and firms in higher quintiles are active and deviate from the passive benchmarks.
In Table 2 , we report the average characteristics of each quintile portfolio. Active firms have more business segments and lower concentration in capital allocation across segments (as measured by the Herfindahl index). They are also smaller than the passive firms. However, since our sample focuses only on conglomerate firms which tend to be large firms, even firms in the most active quintile are pretty large and have an average firm size of 1,681 million dollars. Active firms have slightly lower capital expenditure as a fraction of total assets and a higher growth rate in capital expenditure. Active firms also tend to have lower profitability.
The average ROA of firms in the most active quintile is 0.01 across all three measures, while the average ROA is 0.03 or higher for all the other four quintiles.
9 We examine this pattern in greater detail in Section 4.
Following Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), we measure the dispersion in investment opportunities across segments as the dispersion in segment Tobin's Q's. Since we do not have data to estimate Tobin's Q's at the segment level, we estimate it using the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry.
The dispersion in segment Tobin's Q's is defined as the asset-weighted standard deviation of segments' imputed Q divided by their arithmetic mean. We find that the most active firms have the lowest dispersion in Q. This evidence suggests that the capital allocation decisions of active firms are unlikely driven by different investment opportunities across segments.
To compare the risk of financial distress across active and passive firms, we define firm leverage as total book asset less book equity to market equity, and use Ohlson's (1980) Oscore to measure the probability of financial bankruptcy calculated using the most recently available accounting information. We find that although leverage is very similar across the five quintile portfolios, active firms have higher O-score, suggesting that firms closer to financial bankruptcy are more likely to actively change their capital allocation strategies.
Active firms also have less liquid stocks, as measured by Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure, 10 and higher idiosyncratic risk, as measured by the standard deviation of residuals from time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years. Given that active firms are smaller and it is more difficult to analyze their capital allocation decisions, it is not surprising that they have lower analyst coverage, defined as the fraction of firms having fewer than two analysts (Miss. AF), and higher dispersion in analyst forecasts, defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast (following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)).
Firm Profitability
In this section, we compare the operating performance of active and passive firms. The performance result can shed light on the efficiency of the internal capital market. If internal capital allocation is on average efficient due to superior managerial ability in allocating capital to its best use, then we expect more active firms to perform better. On the other hand, if internal capital allocation is largely inefficient due to the lack of managerial ability or the cost of internal power struggle and corporate socialism, then we expect more active firms to perform worse.
We perform a series of tests to understand firm profitability. First, we sort firms into quintile portfolios by our capital allocation measures and report both industry and industryadjusted profitability of the portfolios. Second, we match active and passive firms by their firm size and past industry-adjusted performance and study their subsequent performance difference. Third, we control for other firm characteristics that might be related to firm performance by using bivariate portfolio analysis and multivariate panel regression analysis with firm and year fixed effects.
Industry and Industry-Adjusted Profitability
To understand the impact of industry performance on capital allocation decisions and the subsequent firm performance, we decompose a firm's profitability into industry and industry-adjusted profitability:
where ω j is the asset weight of segment j in firm f and ROA j is the median ROA of singlesegment firms in segment j's industry (using Fama-French 48 industry classification). Thus, the industry profitability is the profitability of a hypothetical industry-mimicking firm that has the same asset weights across industries as firm f , and the industry-adjusted profitability is the difference between the profitability of firm f and its industry profitability.
In Table 3 , we report the average industry and industry-adjusted profitability for all firms in each quintile portfolio sorted by our three measures of capital allocation style. Panel A reports the average industry profitability and Panel B reports the average industry-adjusted profitability. While there is no significant difference between their industry profitability, active firms have significantly lower industry-adjusted profitability than passive firms. For example, using the DLC measure, in Panel A1, in the year following portfolio formation (t=1), the average industry profitability is similar at 2.70% for the passive firms and 2.45%
for the active firms. In contrast, in Panel B1, the average industry-adjusted profitability ranges from 1.18% for the passive firms to -2.02% for the active firms. The profitability difference of 3.20% between the active and passive firms is statistically significant at the one percent level. It is also economically significant given the average industry profitability level of around 3% for all firms. The difference is driven symmetrically by both the superior performance of passive firms and the inferior performance of active firms. The results are similar using the other two capital allocation measures (DIC or DSF ), except that active firms also have lower industry performance using the DSF measure. But the performance difference is still much more pronounced for the industry-adjusted performance (at -3.15%
in year 1) than for the industry performance (at -0.91% in year 1).
The pattern is similar both preceding and following portfolio formation. The relative performance of active and passive firms prior to the portfolio formation period allows us to conjecture the motivations behind capital allocation strategies. Active and passive firms differ mainly in their industry-adjusted profitability rather than their average industry profitability prior to the portfolio formation period. This evidence suggests that active capital allocation decisions are motivated not by the poor industry performance of business segments but by the poor performance of business segments relative to their industry peers.
This result is intuitive: It is hard to identify profitable industries going forward, not to mention using the forecasted industry profitability to justify capital allocation decisions within the firm; 11 on the other hand, it is easier to spot segments that are leading or lagging their industry peers and use these deviations to justify changes in capital allocation rules.
Firms with low profitability relative to their industry peers are more likely to actively deviate from a benchmark capital allocation rule. A priori, however, it is not clear how firms should deviate from their benchmarks. They can either penalize poor performance by reducing capital allocation to the lagging segments or try to improve these segments by increasing their capital allocation. Therefore, while it is possible that more active firms perform better by improving their operating efficiency, it is also perceivable that the more a firm deviates from passive capital allocation rules, the more power struggle and valuedestructing activities occur within the firm.
The relative performance of active and passive firms subsequent to the portfolio formation period sheds light on the efficiency of these active capital allocation decisions. We find that active firms have similar industry performance to passive firms but have significantly lower industry-adjusted performance. The similar industry performance suggests that, while conglomerate firms on average are not able to create value by allocating capital to the most productive industries, they on average do not destroy value by poor timing either. On the other hand, the divergent industry-adjusted performance suggests that, while it is easier to justify active capital allocation across business segments based on their relative performance in their corresponding industries, these active decisions are largely ineffective and lead to poor operating performance of active firms.
The poor future performance of active firms can be interpreted in two ways, with different normative implications. The first interpretation is that active changes in the capital allocation process can destroy value and lead to inefficient outcome, due to either poor managerial ability or costly power struggle within the firm. This interpretation suggests that firms should set benchmark capital allocation rules and refrain from active adjustments whenever possible. The alternative interpretation is that firms with low profitability relative to their industry peers are more likely to change their capital allocation decisions and are measured as active firms. The poor performance of active firms merely reflects the inability of these firms to reverse their poor prior performance, and does not suggest that these firms are destroying value by following active strategies. After all, we do not observe the counterfactual outcome had these firms followed passive strategies, which might have been even worse.
To separate the two potential interpretations, in the next several subsections, we conduct matching analysis, bivariate analysis with other firm characteristics, and panel regression with firm fixed effects to further investigate the source of active firms' poor subsequent performance. Given that the differential profitability between active and passive firms is concentrated in the industry-adjusted profitability, we focus future analyses on industryadjusted profitability.
Matching Analysis
To investigate further whether active capital allocation per se or other firm characteristics are driving the poor industry-adjusted profitability of active conglomerate firms, we conduct matching analysis by matching active and passive firms using their respective firm size and past performance. If the poor performance of active firms is merely a continuation of their poor past performance, then we expect the matched sample to have similar subsequent performance; if on the other hand, managers of active firms lack the ability to properly allocate capital or the lack of clear guideline in the active capital allocation process intensifies internal power struggle and destroys value, then we expect active firms in the matched sample to have lower subsequent performance.
Each year, for each of our capital allocation measures, we conduct the matching using the average firm size and industry-adjusted profitability over the previous three years (t = −2 to t = 0). We use the three-year average variables since our capital allocation measures are averaged over three years. The matching is a one-to-one matching with replacement. We find the closest match for each passive firm (in the lowest quintile) using active firms (in the highest quintile) and report the difference in industry-adjusted profitability between the passive firms and their active matches.
The matching results are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . It is not surprising that passive firms and their active matches have similar industry-adjusted profitability for each of the three years prior to the portfolio formation period, since they are matched based on the threeyear average of past profitability. Interestingly, as Panel A1 indicates, while the passive firms maintain a similar industry-adjusted profitability following the portfolio formation period, their matched firms in the active quintile experience a significant reduction in their average industry-adjusted profitability, from more than 1.21% for year 0 or before to less than 0.39% for all years after year 0. As a result, the matched firms in the active quintile perform significantly worse than their passive counterparts, yielding a profitability difference of at least 0.83% in each of the years following portfolio formation. The results are similar using the other two capital allocation measures, as Panels A2 and A3 illustrates. This evidence suggests that at least some of the poor performance of active firms is a direct consequence of following active capital allocation rules. Figure 1 depicts the diverging subsequent performance of passive firms and their active matches.
For robustness, we also construct the closest match for each active firm using firms in the passive quintile and report the difference in industry-adjusted profitability between active firms and their passive matches. The results are similar, as reported in Panel B of Table 4 .
Active firms perform significantly worse than their passive matches following the portfolio formation period, driven mostly by the significant performance reduction of active firms.
Bivariate Analysis
To understand the driving force behind the poor performance of active firms and to control for the possibility that the result is driven by other firm characteristics that are correlated with firm profitability, we perform a series of bivariate analyses by independently sorting on the capital allocation measures and other firm characteristics. The firm characteristics include the efficiency of internal capital market (e.g., Billett and Mauer (2003) ), the intensity of internal power struggle (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)), and other firm characteristics that might affect profitability.
We form portfolios by sorting firms independently into two halves using one capital allocation measure and one of the firm characteristics described above. In Tables 5, we construct four portfolios (LL, LH, HL, and HH) for each pair of variables and report the average industry-adjusted profitability for firms in each portfolio in the year following the portfolio formation. We also report the profitability differential between active and passive firms for each characteristic half.
The first and foremost pattern is that active firms, irrespective of the measure of activeness, always have lower industry-adjusted profitability than passive firms. The result holds after controlling for all of the above firm characteristics, suggesting that a firm's capital allocation style is an important determinant of firm performance and that it is distinct from other firm characteristics that are known to affect firm profitability.
Since firms with active internal capital allocation perform worse subsequently, one might conjecture that being active is an indication of inefficiency within the firm and it might be particularly costly for firms with inefficient investments. Billett and Mauer (2003) suggest that some internal capital allocation are more efficient than others. They study explicitly the transfer of capital via the internal capital market and show that transfers to financially constrained segments with good investment opportunities significantly increase firm valuation.
Following Billett and Mauer (2003) , we use imputed Tobin's Q to proxy for investment opportunities and use the imputed probability of paying a dividend to proxy for the likelihood of facing a binding financial constraint. The imputed Tobin's Q for a segment is defined by first estimating the following regression for all single-segment firms in its corresponding industry for each year t:
where Q jt is the Tobin's-Q (book value of assets plus the difference between the market and book values of equity to the book value of asset) of single segment firm j in the same industry as the segment; SIZE jt is the log of total assets; F CF jt is the ratio of free cash flow (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation) to total assets for firm j; and SALES jt is the ratio of sales to total assets. We then use the regression coefficient and the segment's own SIZE, F CF , and SALES to impute the segment's Q. We winsorize the imputed Q at the minimum and the maximum of the observed Q for single-segment firms. The probability of paying a dividend for segment j is estimated with a logit model using all single-segment firms over the full sample. The model includes Q, size, return on asset, sales to asset, year dummies, and industry dummies.
Using these imputed segment values, we introduce two firm-level measures of capital transfer efficiency:
Transfer to Low
where Asset f,t is the total asset of the firm; CAP X j,t −SF j,t is the difference between capital expenditure and free cash flow for segment j, which reflects funding through internal capital transfer; SQ j,t is the imputed Tobin's Q of segment j; P rDiv j,t is segment j's imputed probability of paying dividend; and w j,t is the asset weight of segment j. We define a firm as transferring resources to high Q segments if the Transfer-to-High-Q measure is above the median, and similarly for the Transfer-to-Low-Dividend measure. These two measures are similar in spirit to the measures in Billett and Mauer (2003) , which are triple interaction terms by considering simultaneously the direction of capital transfer, the investment efficiency (Q), and the financial constraint (probability of paying a dividend). To better understand the impact of investment efficiency and financial constraint, we choose to report these two measures separately.
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The first two columns in Table 5 report the results of double sorting on the measures of transfer efficiency and the capital allocation measures. Consistent with the notion that transfers to segments with better investment opportunity and binding financial constraints are on average efficient, we find that the industry-adjusted profitability of firms with these efficient transfers are higher than the firms with inefficient transfers, but the difference is not significant (from unreported analyses that combine active and passive firms in each group).
Active firms always have lower profitability than passive firms whether they have efficient or inefficient transfers. Surprisingly, the performance difference between active and passive firms is more pronounced for firms that efficiently transfer capital to high Q segments. This evidence suggests that the inefficiency of transferring capital to low Q segments is not the main driver of active firms' poor performance.
On the other hand, being active is more costly for firms that transfer capital to highdividend segments than for firms that transfer capital to low-dividend segments. This evidence suggests that transfers to segments that are not financially constrained (high-dividend segments) might be motivated by power struggle or corporate socialism, and that these inefficiency might be behind the cost of active capital allocation.
To understand the possibility of power struggle within the firm, we use characteristics of the CEO (including the age of CEO and whether the CEO is a chairman of the board) and the dispersion in segments' investment opportunities (following Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000))as proxies of power struggle.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 report the double sort result using CEO characteristics and the capital allocation measures. We find that firms with older CEOs or chairman CEOs on average perform better, consistent with these CEOs being more powerful and more successful. Surprisingly, we find that being active is particularly costly for these firms rather than for firms with young and/or non-chairman CEOs. For example, the difference between active and passive firms is 1.77% for old CEOs and only 0.81% for young CEOs.
This evidence is consistent with the notion that old, powerful CEOs have established their style. If they tend to follow more objective (i.e., passive) benchmark rules in the capital allocation process, less power struggle occurs within the firm and the firm performs particularly well. If on the other hand, they tend to change capital allocation based on more subjective (i.e., active) rules, segment managers are more likely to devote energy to fighting for internal resources and the firm performance suffers as a consequence.
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) suggest that the dispersion in segments' investment opportunities might intensify the power struggle within the firm. The fifth column of Table   5 shows that more dispersed firms have higher industry-adjusted profitability. This finding suggests that either dispersion is a poor proxy for power struggle or power struggle does not necessarily lead to poor profitability. 13 The performance difference between active and passive firms are not significantly different between high and low dispersion firms.
In unreported analyses, we also control for other firm characteristics that might affect profitability. The characteristics include like size, age, industry-adjusted valuation (Berger and Ofek (1995) ), the growth in capital expenditure, Ohlson's (1980) measure of the prob-ability of financial bankruptcy (O-score), the imputed probability of paying dividends, and whether the firm increased or decreased the number of segments in the previous three years.
We find that larger, older firms, and firms with higher CAPX growth or lower financial constraints (as measured by lower O-score or higher probability of paying dividends) have higher future profitability. The poor performance of active firms remains after controlling for these characteristics. Moreover, the performance difference between active and passive firms is not significantly different for firms in different characteristic groups.
In summary, the impact of capital allocation style on firm profitability is distinct from the correlation between profitability and observable firm characteristics. While the profitability result suggests that our capital allocation measures are related to the efficiency of internal capital market, the measures are distinct from the existing measures of capital allocation efficiency identified in the literature.
Regression Analysis
To further control for observable and unobserved firm characteristics, we perform a fixedeffect panel regression analysis that includes various firm characteristics as well as year and firm fixed effects:
The dependent variable is the future industry-adjusted profitability for the firm. The main independent variable is our capital allocation measure. In Table 6 , we report separately the regression coefficients using each of our allocation measures. For each allocation measure, we report results both with and without firm fixed effects. Since our allocation measures are highly skewed, we use the log transformation of each of these measures, e.g, ALLOCAT ION = ln(.001 + DLC) for the DLC measure.
The control variables include two measures of internal capital allocation efficiency, Transfer-to-High-Q and Transfer-to-Low-Dividend, as defined in equations (7) and (8); two lags of industry-adjusted profitability and one lag of industry-adjusted valuation; and other firm characteristics such as size, number of segments, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX), the growth rate in capital expenditure, the dispersion in segments' Q, leverage ratio, Ohlson's (1980) O-score, and the Herfindahl index of segments' capital expenditure.
All control variables are lagged by one year. Table 4 . The results are similar for the other measures.
The coefficient for other control variables are mostly consistent with findings in the literature. For example, profitability is persistent over time; firms with higher valuation levels tend to have higher future profitability; larger firms tend to be more profitable; firms that transfer capital to more financially constrained segments (as proxied by lower probability of paying dividends) tend to have higher future profitability. A bit surprisingly, firms with more dispersed segments' Q tend to have higher future profitability whereas firms that transfer capital to higher Q segments tend to have lower future profitability. These results appear to contradict the insights of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Billett and Mauer (2003) that more dispersed firms are less efficient due to power struggle and transfers to higher Q segments are efficient. It is important to keep in mind that their results are both on the valuation level of firms. In Table 9 , we report the regression results for firm valuation on these measures and are able to reproduce their result. This discrepancy between profitability and valuation result suggests that market valuation may not properly reflect the operating efficiency of the firm; we explore this potential misvaluation in greater detail in the next section.
In summary, the regression results in this subsection confirm that active firms have lower future profitability than passive firms, even after adjusting for other firm characteristics and after controlling for firm and year fixed effects. This finding begs the question of whether the stock market recognizes this differential performance in its assessment of firm value.
Valuation and Stock Return
In this section, we compare both the valuation levels and the subsequent stock returns of active and passive firms to investigate whether the market price properly incorporates their differential operating performance.
Firm Valuation
To capture firm valuation, we use industry-adjusted valuation following Berger and Ofek (1995) . In particular, we define a firm's industry-adjusted valuation as
where M f is market value of assets for firm f (market value of equity plus book value of debt), B j is the book asset of segment j, and (M/B) j is the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry as segment j. Table 7 reports the industry-adjusted valuation of firms in quintile portfolios sorted by our capital allocation measures. Consistent with the notion that the lower future profitability of active firms is incorporated into stock prices, we find that active firms have lower industryadjusted valuation than passive firms. Specifically, the industry-adjusted valuation decreases monotonically with all three capital allocation measures.
Moreover, the results in Table 7 (2002) and Chevalier (2004) find that firms that choose to become conglomerates are different from firms that choose to stay as standalone firms. Since our results rely on the comparison between different conglomerate firms (active vs. passive), they are less subject to the usual criticism. Nonetheless, it is possible that firms that choose active capital allocation strategies are different from firms that choose to follow passive benchmark strategies. We perform a matching analysis as well as a regression analysis to address the potential concern of sample selection.
The matching analysis is similar to the matching analysis for profitability in Table 4 .
Each year, for each of our capital allocation measures, we match active and passive firms in the extreme quintiles using a one-to-one matching with replacement. The match is based on the average firm size and industry-adjusted valuation over the previous three years (t = −2 to 0). By construction, the average valuations are similar across the two matched samples prior to the portfolio formation period. Following the portfolio formation, the passive firms have an average valuation of about 2-3% higher than their active counterparts. Therefore, the low valuation of active firms is not driven completely by a sample selection bias in which lower valuation firms choose more active capital allocation strategies. At least part of the low valuation is a direct consequence of following active capital allocation strategies.
To further account for the impacts of other firm characteristics on firm valuation, we perform the following panel regression analysis:
The dependent variable is the future industry-adjusted valuation and the main independent variable is our capital allocation measures. In Table 9 , we report separately the regression coefficients using each one of our allocation measures. Similar to the profitability regression in Table 6 , we use the log transformation of each of these measures. In addition to the control variables in that regression, we include stock beta (using time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years) and the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock (the standard deviation of residuals from the market model) to control for risk.
The parameter estimates from these regressions are reported in Table 9 . In all specifications, we find a negative coefficient β 1 , confirming the result from the portfolio analysis that more active firms have lower future industry-adjusted valuation levels. The coefficient for other control variables are also consistent with findings in the literature. For example, we find that firms with more efficient internal capital transfers (to higher Q segments or to segments with lower probability of paying dividends) tend to have higher valuation levels (consistent with Billett and Mauer (2003) ); firms with more dispersed segments' Q have lower valuation levels (consistent with Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)).
In summary, active firms have lower valuation levels than passive firms, suggesting that at least some of the poor future profitability of active firms is already incorporated into stock prices. This lower valuation remains after controlling for sample selection and other firm characteristics.
Subsequent Stock Returns
In this subsection, we analyze the subsequent stock returns of active and passive firms. We use both portfolio and regression analyses to assess the impact of capital allocation styles on future stock returns.
For portfolio analysis, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios according to their capital allocation measure at the end of each June. We compute both equal-weighted and valueweighted average return of all stocks in the corresponding portfolio in each of the three years after the portfolio formation period (t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3). By analyzing the future performance of stocks after computing the capital allocation measure, we avoid any potential issues of reverse causality. Subsequently, we compute the abnormal returns after adjusting for risk and style effects using the four-factor Carhart (1997) model:
where R p,t is the return of portfolio p; the index M corresponds to the market portfolio and the index T B to the risk-free Treasury bill rate; portfolios of small and large stocks are denoted by S and B; portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios are denoted by H and L; and portfolios of stocks with relatively high and low returns during the previous year are denoted by U and D. The subsequent stock returns provide a fuller picture of the market's reaction to capital allocation activities. In the previous subsection we observe that active firms have lower valuation levels than passive firms, suggesting that at least part of their poor future profitability is incorporated into stock prices. Their poor subsequent stock returns, however, suggest that their poor future profitability and other information revealed by the capital allocation measures are not yet fully incorporated into stock prices. Moreover, Table 10 shows that these return differential persists for several years, indicating that this information is only very slowly incorporated into the firm's stock price.
Panel B of Table 10 reports the same results using equally-weighted portfolio. The results are not as strong, indicating that the differential stock performance between active and passive firms is driven mainly by larger firms. This result is surprising at first glance, since smaller firms are usually considered less informationally efficient and most mispricing results in the literature are concentrated in smaller firms. However, since larger firms have a more complex internal capital market than smaller firms, this evidence further suggests that our result is driven by the difficulty of incorporating capital allocation information into the prices. Moreover, the strong value-weighted result makes it a feasible trading strategy to form long-short portfolios of active and passive firms, since the portfolio puts more weight on large capitalization stocks and requires no rebalancing.
While the Carhart (1997) four-factor model controls for the most important risk factors, it does not take into account the multitudes of firm and stock characteristics that can be correlated with both our capital allocation measures and subsequent returns. To systematically analyze the effect of these firm and stock characteristics on our result as well as to take into account cross-correlations between these variables, we perform the following Fama-MacBeth style regression.
The dependent variable is the monthly industry-adjusted stock return, where R f,t+1 is the firm's stock return, w j is the asset weight of segment j, and R j,t+1 is the value-weighted average return of single-segment firms in segment j's industry (using Fama-French-48 industry classification). The main independent variable is our capital allocation measures. In Ta- ble 11, we report separately the regression coefficients using each of our allocation measures.
Similar to the regressions in Tables 6 and 9 , we use the log transformation of each of these measures. In addition to the control variables in these two regressions, we control for stock characteristics by including book-to-market ratio (book value of equity divided by market capitalization), momentum (stock returns over the preceding 12 months), Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure 14 , and dispersion in analyst forecasts, defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast (following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)). For firms with fewer than two analysts, the dispersion measure cannot be calculated. We define the firm as missing analyst forecast measure and include an indicator variable for it. Table 11 reports the coefficient estimates of these regressions. In all specifications, we find a negative coefficient β 1 , confirming the portfolio analysis that more active firms have lower subsequent stock returns. Therefore, the information revealed in the capital allocation process is not fully incorporated in stock prices.
There are several reasons that one could contemplate the possibility of the stock market not fully incorporating the capital allocation information in stock returns. First, managing an internal capital market is complicated. The literature shows that at times an internal capital market can be beneficial to the firm, but at times it is destructive. Hence, it is 14 We thank Joel Hasbrouck for providing this measure on his website.
not obvious that the stock market can easily decipher how the firm's capital allocation activities affect firm value. Second, investors do not directly observe the inner workings of the internal capital market. They have to use less than perfect proxies to assess how the firm performs its internal capital allocation. The more a firm actively deviates from simple benchmark strategies, the harder it is for investors to decipher this information. Consistent with this notion of active firms being more complex to analyze, in Table 2 we find that more active firms have a higher dispersion in earnings forecasts among financial analysts.
Third, there is extensive evidence in the literature that the stock market does not always reflect all the information available about the firm, especially information about intangibles of the firm. For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) find that the market does not fully incorporate information about the firm's R&D expenditure; Lamont and Polk (2001) find that the information conveyed in the conglomerate discount predict future stock returns; Daniel and Titman (2006) find that the market does not fully incorporate intangible information about the firm; Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) and Xing (2008) find that the growth in firms' capital expenditure is negatively related to the subsequent stock returns; and Hou and Robinson (2008) and Hoberg and Phillips (2008) find that information about product market competition is not fully incorporated into prices.
Thus, it is reasonable that market price may not fully incorporate the information revealed by the internal capital allocation process.
Conclusions
In this paper we categorize conglomerate firms as active or passive depending on the degree of active deviation from passive benchmark strategies in their capital allocation process. We introduce three passive benchmarks and construct capital allocation measures based on the deviation of firms' action from these passive benchmarks. The first measure, the Deviation from Lagged Capital allocation (DLC), uses firms' own capital allocation in the previous year as a benchmark. The second measure, the Deviation from Industry-adjusted Capital allocation (DIC), uses the capital allocation in corresponding single segment firms as the benchmark. The third measure, the Deviation from Segment Free-cash-flow (DSF ), uses the free cash flow generated by each segment as the benchmark.
We ask whether conglomerate firms that actively deviate from these benchmark perform better than those that passively follow the benchmarks. Since all three benchmarks are easily implementable for conglomerate firms, our measures allow us to capture the value creation or destruction by firms' active choice in the capital allocation process.
Our main finding is that, irrespective of the definition of activeness, more active firms have worse performance, as measured by their lower industry-adjusted profitability. This result is robust after matching active and passive firm by their firm size and past profitability, and still holds after controlling for various firm characteristics including size, number of segments, investment opportunity, growth, dispersion among segments, leverage, financial distress, and time and firm fixed-effects. This finding suggests that conglomerate firms that are more active in their internal capital allocation process do not do so efficiently. This inefficiency could be driven by poor managerial ability at identifying profitable investment opportunities across various industries. It is also possible that the lack of clear guidelines in the internal capital allocation process intensifies internal power struggles and leads to inefficient resource allocation.
We also find that these active firms have lower valuation levels, as measured by their industry-adjusted Q, and lower subsequent excess stock returns than firms that follow more passive capital allocation strategies. Both results hold after a battery of robustness tests.
This finding is consistent with the notion that the stock market does not fully incorporate the information revealed through the capital allocation process. This figure reports the results from analyzing industry-adjusted profitability using matched firms. The matching is a one-to-one matching with replacement using the average of size and industry-adjusted profitability over the preceding three years (t = −3 to t = −1). This figure compares firms in the low DLC/DIC/DSF quintile to their closest matches in the high DLC/DIC/DSF quintile. The industry-adjusted profitability (y-axis) is reported in percentage points. j∈F CAP Xj,t−1 , where CAP X i,t is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm f in year t, and the set F includes all segments that appear in both year t−1 and t; dic f,t = 1 2 i∈F CAP Xi,t j∈F CAP Xj,t − gi,t CAP Xi,t−1 j∈F gj,t CAP Xj,t−1 , where g i,t = ( s∈I CAP X s,t )/ ( s∈I CAP X s,t−1 ) is the growth rate of the aggregate capital expenditure of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry I as segment i; and dsf f,t = 1 2 i∈F CAP Xi,t j∈F CAP Xj,t − SFi,t−1 j∈F SFj,t−1 , where SF i,t is the sum of income and depreciation in segment i. Panel A reports the summary statistics of our sample as well as three subperiods (1981-1988, 1989-1997, and 1998-2006) . Panel B presents the distribution statistics of DLC, DIC, and DSF . Panel C reports the cross-correlations of DLC, DIC, and DSF as well as their respective correlations with other firm characteristics. The firm characteristics are measured at the firm level at the end of the fiscal year unless specified otherwise. N(Seg.) is the number of segments. Asset is book value of total asset. Book-to-market ratio (B/M) is the book value of equity divided by market capitalization. ROA is income before extraordinary item divided by the average value of total asset at the beginning and at the end of the fiscal year. CAPX/Asset is capital expenditure divided by total asset. H(CAPX) is the concentration of segments' capital expenditure measured using Herfindahl index. %∆CAP X is is the annualized percentage change in the firm's capital expenditure calculated over 3 years. Sales/Asset is net sales divided by total asset. This table summarizes the characteristics of quintile portfolios sorted by each of our capital allocation measures: DLC, DIC, and DSF . Panels A, B and C report the summary statistics of quintile portfolios sorted by DLC, DIC, and DSF , respectively. These measures are defined in Table 1 . In addition to the firm characteristics defined in Table 1 , this table also includes the following firm characteristics. The dispersion in segment Tobin's Q's is defined as the asset-weighted standard deviation of segments' imputed Q divided by their arithmetic mean (following Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). Each segment's imputed Q is calculated as the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French industry. The O-score is Ohlson's (1980) measure of the probability of financial bankruptcy calculated using the most recently available accounting information. Leverage (Debt/Asset) is the ratio of total book asset less book equity to market equity. Illiquidity is Amihud's (2002) This table summarizes the industry and industry-adjusted profitability of quintile portfolios sorted by our capital allocation measures: DLC, DIC, and DSF . Panel A reports the average industry profitability in each quintile portfolio and Panel B reports the average industry-adjusted firm profitability. The industry profitability of a conglomerate firm is defined as the profitability of an industry-mimicking firm, constructed using the asset weights across industries of the conglomerate firm (using Fama-French 48 industry classification) in the portfolio formation year t. The profitability of the industry-mimicking firm is defined as the asset-weighted average of the median single-segment firms' ROA in each of its segments' industry, in years both preceding and following t. The industry-adjusted profitability is defined as the firm's own ROA minus its industry-mimicking firm's ROA. All numbers are reported in percentage points. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West correction. Each year, we sort firms independently into two halves on one of our capital allocation measures (DLC, DIC, or DSF ) and a firm characteristic (industry-adjusted valuation, size, the growth in capital expenditure, dispersion in segment Tobin's Q's, CEO age, and whether CEO is the chairman of the board). For each pair of variables, we construct four portfolios. We report the industry-adjusted profitability over the following year for each of these portfolios. A firm's industry-adjusted valuation is the natural logarithm of its market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by its imputed value. The imputed value is calculated by summing the product of each segment's asset and the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry. Our industry-adjusted valuation follows the definition in Berger and Ofek (1995) except for the industry classification. The other firm characteristics are defined in Tables 1 and 2 . All numbers are reported in percentage points. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West correction. This table reports the estimates from panel regressions of industry-adjusted profitability. The main independent variable in each regression is the log transformation of one of our capital allocation measures: DLC, DIC, or DSF . A firm's industry-adjusted profitability is defined as its ROA minus the asset-weighted average of the median single-segment firms' ROA in each of its segments' industry (using Fama-French 48 industry classification). Each regression also includes the following control variables: size (sales), number of segments, lagged industry-adjusted profitability, industry-adjusted valuation (see Table 5 ), capital expenditure, growth rate in capital expenditure, dispersion in segments' imputed Tobin's Q, leverage, Ohlson's o-score, firm-level concentration in capital expenditure, and year fixed effects. The firm characteristics are defined in Tables 1 and 2 . All coefficient estimates are reported in percentage points. The standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West correction. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the results from analyzing industry-adjusted valuation using matched firms. The matching is a one-to-one matching with replacement using the average of size and industry-adjusted valuation over the preceding three years. A firm's industry-adjusted valuation is the natural logarithm of its market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by its imputed value. The imputed value is calculated by summing the product of each segment's asset and the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry. Our industry-adjusted valuation follows the definition in Berger and Ofek (1995) The main independent variable in each regression is the log transformation of one of our capital allocation measures: DLC, DIC, or DSF . The dependent variable in each regression is industry-adjusted valuation. A firm's industryadjusted valuation is the natural logarithm of its market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by its imputed value. The imputed value is calculated by summing the product of each segment's asset and the median market-to-book asset ratio of single-segment firms in the same Fama-French-48 industry. Our industry-adjusted valuation follows the definition in Berger and Ofek (1995) except for the industry classification. Each regression also includes the following control variables: lagged industry-adjusted valuation, size (sales), number of segments, lagged industry-adjusted profitability (see Table 3 ), capital expenditure, growth rate in capital expenditure, dispersion in segments' imputed Tobin's Q, leverage, Ohlson's o-score, firm-level concentration in capital expenditure, idiosyncratic volatility, beta, and year fixed effects. The firm characteristics are defined in Tables 1 and 2 , except for firm beta (estimated using time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years) and idiosyncratic volatility (the standard deviation of residuals from time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years).
All coefficient estimates are reported in percentage points. The standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West correction. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports average future stock returns as a function of our capital allocation measures: DLC, DiC3, and DSF . Panels A1-A3 (B1-B3) report the average monthly excess returns of value-weighted (equal-weighted) quintile portfolios of stocks sorted by DLC, DIC, or DSF . These portfolios are constructed at the end of June and held for twelve months from July to next June (denoted by year t ), the subsequent twelve months (year t+1 ), and so on. For each portfolio, we report the monthly alphas from Carhart (1997) This table reports the estimates from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The main independent variable in each regression is the log transformation of one of our capital allocation measures: DLC3, DIC3, or DSF3. The dependent variable in each regression is industry-adjusted monthly return, which is calculated as a particular firm's raw stock return minus the weighted average of the industry return of each of its segments. The industry returns are calculated as the value-weighted average returns of single-segment firms in each industry. Each specification includes the following control variables: firm beta (estimated using time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years), book-to-market ratio (book value of equity divided by market capitalization), size (market capitalization), momentum (stock returns over the preceding 12 months), number of segments, industry-adjusted profitability (see Table 3 ), industry-adjusted valuation (see Table 7 ), growth rate in asset, growth rate in capital expenditure, dispersion in segments' asset growth rate, dispersion in segments' imputed Tobin's Q, Ohlson's (1980) O-score, leverage, Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, idiosyncratic risk (the standard deviation of residuals from time-series market model regression of monthly returns over 3 years), dispersion in analyst forecast (following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)), and missing analyst forecast (an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there are less than two earnings forecasts, and 0 otherwise). All coefficient estimates are reported in percentage points. The standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West correction. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
